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ROADBLOCKS: EXAMINING TITLE IX & THE FAIR 
COMPENSATION OF DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDENT-
ATHLETES 
Undoubtedly, the world of Division I intercollegiate athletics generates 
hundreds of millions of dollars each year for the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA), Division I athletic conferences, and the respective 
universities. During the 2013–2014 year alone, the NCAA’s gross revenue 
totaled $497,600,000,1 with a majority of the revenue generated through 
various media rights payments.2 For example, in 2010, the NCAA, CBS, and 
Turner Sports agreed to a fourteen-year, $10.8 billion agreement for the media 
rights to the sixty-eight team Division I men’s basketball tournament.3 More 
recently, ESPN and the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), an organization 
composed of Division I member conferences and their respective institutions, 
agreed to a twelve-year, $5.64 billion deal for the newly created college 
football playoff system.4 The NCAA also has an agreement with ESPN 
granting the TV network the right to broadcast the NCAA women’s basketball 
tournament, College World Series, and twenty other NCAA championships 
worth close to $18 million per year.5 According to the NCAA, all of its 
revenue is distributed amongst Division I member institutions and their 
respective conferences through the Division I Revenue Distribution Plan.6 The 
plan is described as a method “that rewards competitive performance over 
time, . . . promotes athletically related financial aid and sports sponsorship, . . . 
enhances academic performance, . . . [and] provides special assistance for 
student-athletes with financial needs.”7 
 
 1. Revenue, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/ 
files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 2. Finances, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/ 
finances (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 3. Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Reaches 14-year Deal with CBS/Turner for Men’s Basketball 
Tournament, which Expands to 68 Teams for now, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2010, http://content.usa 
today.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2010/04/ncaa-reaches-14-year-deal-with-cbsturner/. 
 4. Rachel Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
21, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324851704578133223970790516 
(estimating the deal to generate upwards of $470 million annually). 
 5. See O’Toole, supra note 3. 
 6. Distributions, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/re 
sources/finances/distributions (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 7. Id. 
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Although athletic programs receive portions of their revenue from NCAA 
agreements, it is not the sole source for many of the top programs. In a study 
documenting the revenues and expenses at NCAA Division I public 
universities from 2006 to 2011,8 USA Today Sports determined the nation’s top 
five athletic programs each grossed over $120 million in revenue during the 
six-year period.9 Additionally, some athletic programs, such as the University 
of Texas, have secured their own media rights agreements. The university, in 
 
 8. USA TODAY SPORTS, USA TODAY SPORTS’ COLLEGE ATHLETICS FINANCES: DETAILS 
OF REVENUES AND EXPENSES AT NCAA D-I PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2006-2011, May 16, 2012, 
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athlet 
ics-finances-database/54955804/1. 
 9. Id. The top five revenue generating athletic programs (in order) were the University of 
Texas, the Ohio State University, the University of Michigan, the University of Alabama, and the 
University of Florida. Id. Total revenue include (1) ticket sales (“Sales of admissions to athletic 
events. Include ticket sales to the public, faculty and students, and money received for shipping 
and handling of tickets. Does not include amounts in excess of face value or sale for conference 
and national tournaments that are pass-through transaction.”), student fees (“Fees assess to 
support athletics.”), (2) school funds (“Includes both direct and indirect support from the 
university, including state funds, tuition, tuition waivers etc. as well as federal Work Study 
amounts for athletes. It also includes university-provided support such as administrative costs, 
facilities and grounds maintenance, security, risk management, utilities, depreciation and 
Sponsored Links debt service.”), (3) contributions (“Includes amounts received directly from 
individuals, corporations, associations, foundations, clubs or other organizations by the donor for 
the operation of the athletic program. Report amounts paid in excess of ticket’s value. 
Contributions include cash, marketable securities and in-kind contributions such as dealer-
provided cars, apparel and drink products for team and staff use. Also includes revenue from 
preferential seating.”), (4) rights/licensing (“Includes revenue for athletics from radio and 
television broadcasts, Internet and ecommerce rights received from institution-negotiated 
contracts, the NCAA and conference revenue sharing arrangements; and revenue from corporate 
sponsorships, licensing, sales of advertisements, trademarks and royalties. Includes the value of 
in-kind products and services provided as part of the sponsorship e.g., equipment, apparel, soft 
drinks, water and isotonic products.), and (5) other revenue (“All other sources of revenue 
including game guarantees, support from third-parties guaranteed by the school such as TV 
income, housing allowances, camp income, etc.; tournament/bowl game revenues from 
conferences; endowments and investments, revenue from game programs, novelties, food or other 
concessions; and parking revenues and other sources.”). Calculations completed through 
subtracting total expense figures from total revenue figures. Total expenses include (1) 
scholarships (“athletically-related student aid, including summer school and tuition discounts and 
waivers . . . and aid for non-athletes such as student managers”), (2) coaching staff (“all salaries, 
bonuses and benefits reported on the university’s tax forms for coaches and staff, as well as third-
party contributions”), (3) facilities (“facilities costs charged to the athletic program, including 
debt service, maintenance, utilities and rental fees.”), and (4) other (“Includes guarantees paid to 
other schools, severance payments to past coaches and staff, recruiting, team travel, equipment 
and uniforms, game day and camp expenses, fundraising and marketing costs, spirit group 
support, medical expense/insurance and conference dues. It also includes expenses charged to 
athletics by the university, such as building maintenance.”). 
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conjunction with ESPN, created the “Longhorn Network.”10 The twenty-year, 
$300 million agreement11 created what is described as “a broadband network 
for University of Texas live sports programming”12 that “harnesses the quality 
ESPN has built through its TV networks and delivers online programming to 
Longhorn fans through a rich, interactive, and easy-to-use experience.”13 
As the revenue continues to grow, the NCAA maintains its bar against 
compensating student-athletes outside of the grant-in-aid they may receive.14 
Pursuant to the NCAA Division I Manual, “[o]nly an amateur student-athlete is 
eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”15 They 
are prohibited from receiving a share of the revenue generated by any of the 
aforementioned agreements. In fact, a student-athlete may lose his or her 
eligibility to participate in NCAA competition if the individual16 (1) uses his or 
her athletic skills (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport;17 (2) 
accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following 
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;18 (3) signs a contract or 
commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of its legal 
enforceability or any consideration received;19 (4) receives, directly or 
indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial 
assistance from a professional sports organization based on athletic skill or 
participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations;20 (5) 
competes on any professional athletics team, even if no pay or remuneration 
for expenses was received;21 (6) after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, 
enters into a professional draft;22 or (7) enters into an agreement with an 
agent.23 
 
 10. See THE LONGHORN NETWORK, http://espn.go.com/longhornnetwork/ (last visited Feb. 
18, 2014). 
 11. Michael Rosenberg, University of Texas’ TV Network is a Lucrative Web of Conflicts, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/01/20/texas-tv. 
 12. See THE LONGHORN NETWORK, supra note 10 (follow “ABOUT” hyperlink). 
 13. See id. (follow “ABOUT” hyperlink). 
 14. See NCAA ACAD. & MEMBERSHIP AFF. STAFF, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12, § 
12.1.4 (2013) (“A grant-in-aid administered by an educational institution is not considered to be 
pay or the promise of pay for athletics skills, provided it does not exceed the financial aid 
limitations set by the Association’s membership.”) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]. 
 15. Id. § 12.1.1. 
 16. Id. § 12.1.2. 
 17. Id. § 12.1.2(a). 
 18. Id. § 12.1.2(b). 
 19. Id. § 12.1.2(c). 
 20. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, § 12.1.2(d). 
 21. Id. § 12.1.2(e). 
 22. Id. § 12.1.2(f). 
 23. Id. § 12.1.2(g). 
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The rules are clear. With that being said, discussions regarding whether or 
not student-athletes should receive compensation arise with more and more 
frequency. Those opposed to paying student-athletes argue the ideal of 
amateurism at the collegiate level would disappear, the distinction between 
professional and collegiate athletics would effectively be erased, and the 
simple concept of a “level playing field” would be eviscerated. On the other 
hand, proponents argue that the student-athletes, the ones largely responsible 
for the growth in revenue and popularity of collegiate sports, are entitled to 
their piece of the billion-dollar pie. Proponents point to the frequency of highly 
publicized media and NCAA investigations regarding impermissible benefits 
as a clear indication that the rules simply do not work.24 Moreover, 
organizations such as the National Collegiate Players Association25 (NCPA) 
continue to push for some form of compensation. In conjunction with Drexel 
University, the NCPA published a study documenting “the shortfall that exists 
between what a ‘full’ scholarship covers and what the full cost of attending 
college is compared to the federal poverty guideline.”26 The study included an 
estimation of players’ fair market value,27 and provided “a perspective on the 
disproportional levels of compensation to which college sports officials have 
and access compared to the limits imposed on revenue-generating athletes.”28 
According to the study, for the 2011–2012 academic year the average annual 
scholarship shortfall29 of an FBS “full scholarship” athlete was $3,285,30 and 
the percentage of FBS schools whose full athletic scholarships leave their 
 
 24. For example, in September of 2013, YAHOO! Sports revealed that five Southeastern 
Conference football stars violated NCAA rules by receiving extra benefits prior to completing 
their careers. The record indicates a former University of Alabama defensive end funneled over 
$45,000 to five collegiate football players. See Charles Robinson & Rand Getlin, Ties Between 
Former Alabama Player and Agents Documented by Text Messages, YAHOO! SPORTS, Sept. 11, 
2013, http://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaaf—ties-between-former-alabama-player-and-agents-docu 
mented-by-text-messages-203153323.html. The allegations violate NCAA bylaw 12.3.1.2, 
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving extra benefits from prospective agents or marketing 
representatives, and could result in retroactive penalties against both the student-athletes still 
competing and their universities. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, § 12.3.1.2. 
 25. The NCPA is a nonprofit advocacy group serving as the only independent voice for 
college athletes across the nation. Its mission is to provide the means for college athletes to voice 
their concerns and change NCAA rules. See Mission & Goals, NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.ncpanow.org/about. 
 26. RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME 
COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (2011). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. “Shortfall,” according to the study constitutes out of pocket expenses incurred by the 
student-athletes themselves. See RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION 
HEIST: ROBBING COLLEGE ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 11 (2012). 
 30. Id. at 12. 
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players in poverty ranged from 82%31 to 90%.32 The study concluded that after 
accounting for about $23,000 in full athletic scholarships, Division I football 
players were denied approximately $114,153 per year while basketball players 
were denied approximately $289,031 per year.33 
Whether or not one believes these student-athletes should be paid, the 
discussion of whether they can be paid remains a critical jumping-off point. 
Central to the examination of legally compensating student-athletes beyond the 
cost of attendance is Title IX of the Education Act of 1972.34 Legal scholars 
note that “[p]erhaps no law has received more attention in the sports industry, 
specifically within high school and collegiate sports, than Title IX. Forty years 
after its enactment, this educational statute has truly reshaped the landscape of 
American Sport.”35 How does Title IX influence the structure and organization 
of paying student-athletes? Can a small percentage of student-athletes, 
specifically those participating in Division I football and basketball programs, 
be compensated without violating Title IX? If Title IX does apply in the 
compensation scheme, will most universities be able to fiscally manage 
payment of their student-athletes? 
This article contends that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
has the potential to effectively bar, or severely limit, payment of student-
athletes outside of their current grant-in-aid. Whether directly or indirectly, 
Title IX effectively prevents most forms of compensation outside of what 
student-athletes currently receive. In order to fully examine the topic, this 
article will first address the history and longstanding relationship between 
intercollegiate athletics and Title IX. Next, this article addresses some of the 
more popular payment proposals by members of the NCAA, legal scholars, 
and members of the media. Finally, this article explores the relationship 
between the proposals and Title IX, examining how and why Title IX may 
prevent such plans from coming to fruition. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE IX AND 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
Enacted as part of the Education Amendments of 1972,36 Title IX provides 
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal 
 
 31. Id. (stating this percentage applies to those scholarship athletes who live on campus). 
 32. Id. (stating this percentage applies to those scholarship athletes living off campus). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 35. Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historic Review of Forty Legal 
Developments that Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 325, 325 (2012). 
 36. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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funds.”37 The statute’s “heart is a broad prohibition of gender-based 
discrimination in all programmatic aspects of educational institutions.”38 It 
generally prohibits “gender-based discrimination by educational institutions 
receiving federal financial support—in practice, the vast majority of all 
accredited colleges and universities.”39 Title IX was passed with two objectives 
in mind: “to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory 
practices”40 and “to provide individual citizens effective protection against 
those practices.”41 
Although enacted in 1972, Title IX’s application to intercollegiate sports 
did not arise until 1974 with the passing of the Javits Amendment (the 
“Amendment”).42 The Amendment required the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW)43 to “prepare and publish . . . proposed 
regulations implementing the provisions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex discrimination in 
federally assisted education programs which shall include with respect to 
intercollegiate athletics reasonable provisions considering the nature of 
particular sports.”44 Published in 1975, the regulations state: 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise 
discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such 
athletics separately on such basis.45 
The regulations also established ten principle factors to be considered when 
examining compliance under the above standard.46 Regarding general athletic 
expenditures, the regulations state: 
 
 37. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 38. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 39. Id. at 893. 
 40. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Anderson, supra note 35, at 330. 
 43. Id. at 330 n.25 (stating the Department of Health, Welfare and Education is currently 
known as the Department of Education). 
 44. Id. at 331 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title VII, Part D, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974)). 
 45. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2012). 
 46. Id. The factors are (1) whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; (2) the provision of 
equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and practice time; (4) travel and per diem 
allowance; (5) opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and 
compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; (8) provision of medical and training facilities and services; (9) provision of housing 
and dining facilities and services; and (10) publicity. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2012). 
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[U]nequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal 
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors 
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the 
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for 
teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each 
sex.47 
Additionally, the regulations include a provision specific to athletic 
scholarships, which provides, “[t]o the extent that a recipient awards athletic 
scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such 
awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of 
each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics,”48 and 
“[s]eparate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex may 
be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to the 
extent consistent with . . . §106.41.”49 
By the end of July 1978, HEW “received nearly 100 complaints alleging 
discrimination in athletics against more than fifty institutions of higher 
education.”50 In response to these complaints and “questions from the 
university community,” the agency published a policy interpretation (the 
“Interpretation”) specifically designed for intercollegiate athletics.51 The 
Interpretation was identified as a means for clarifying “the meaning of ‘equal 
opportunity’ in intercollegiate athletics,”52 and “explain[ed] the factors and 
standards set out in the law and regulation which the Department [would] 
consider in determining whether an institution’s intercollegiate athletics 
program complies with the law and regulations.”53 The Interpretation 
established three broad categories of compliance:54 (1) compliance in financial 
assistance (scholarships) based on athletic ability;55 (2) compliance in other 
program areas56 (including equipment and supplies, games and practice times, 
travel and per diem, coaching and academic tutoring, assignment and 
compensation of coaches and tutors, locker rooms, and competitive facilities, 
medical and training facilities, housing and dining facilities, publicity, 
 
 47. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
 48. 34 C.F.R. §106.37(c)(1) (2012). 
 49. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(2) (2012). 
 50. Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) [hereinafter 1979 Policy Interpretation]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 71,414. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (Pursuant to the regulation, the governing principle in this area is that all such 
assistance should be available on a substantially proportional basis to the number of male and 
female participants in the institution’s athletic program.) 
 56. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 50, at 71,414 (“[T]he governing principle is that 
male and female athletes should receive equivalent treatment, benefits, and opportunities.”). 
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recruitment, and support services);57 and (3) compliance in meeting the 
interests and abilities of male and female students.58 
With regards to the first category, the policy interpretation does not require 
identical assistance for both sexes.59 Instead, institutions will be found 
compliant if the comparison of financial aid offered to men’s and women’s 
athletic programs is “in substantially equal amounts or if a resulting disparity 
can be explained by adjustments to take into account legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory factors.”60 The Interpretation clarifies that it does not 
require the number of scholarships offered to be equal in dollar value; instead, 
the requirement is met if “the total amount of scholarship aid made available to 
men and women [is] substantially proportionate to their participation rates.”61 
With regards to the second category,62 the policy interpretation notes that 
“institutions will be in compliance if the compared program components are 
equivalent, that is, equal or equal in effect.”63 Each factor listed within the 
regulation is assessed by “comparing the availability, quality and kinds of 
benefits, opportunity, and treatment afforded to members of both sexes.”64 If 
an initial assessment finds a disparity, the disparity may then be justified by 
certain nondiscriminatory factors including “unique aspects of particular sports 
or athletic activities”65 and “legitimately sex-neutral factors related to special 
circumstances of a temporary nature.”66 Through this statement, the 
Interpretation recognizes that men’s and women’s teams may have different 
financial requirements “because of unique aspects of particular sports or 
athletic activities,”67 and allows such disparities “[i]f sport-specific needs are 
met equivalently in both men’s and women’s programs.”68 If a recipient fails to 
provide a legitimate justification for the disparity, the Interpretation provides 
for specific criteria to be used in assessing each part of the evaluation.69 
After an analysis involving the specific criteria is completed, the 
Interpretation provides three alternate grounds on which the agency could 
render a finding of noncompliance: (1) whether the policies of an institution 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (“Pursuant to the regulation, the governing principle in this area is that the athletic 
interests and abilities of male and female students must be equally effectively accommodated.”). 
 59. Id. at 71,415. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Catherine Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A Review of Recent Developments, 30 
J.C. & U.L. 75, 78 (2003) (stating this category is also referred to as “equal treatment”). 
 63. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 50, at 74,415. 
 64. Anderson, supra note 35, at 339. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Pieronek, supra note 62, at 79. 
 68. Id. at 79–80 
 69. Anderson, supra note 35, at 338. 
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are discriminatory in language or effect;70 (2) whether the disparities of a 
substantial and unjustified nature exist in the benefits, treatment, services, or 
opportunities afforded male and female athletes in the institution’s program as 
a whole;71 or (3) whether the disparities in benefits, treatment, services, or 
opportunities in individual segments of the program are substantial enough in 
and of themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity.72 For the purposes 
of payments to student-athletes, it is important to note the Interpretation 
declares the “laundry list” of categories “not exhaustive,”73 and that it “may be 
expanded as necessary at the discretion of the Director of the Office for Civil 
Rights.”74 
With regards to the final category, the policy interpretation established a 
“trinitarian model under which the university must meet at least one of three 
benchmarks”75 to comply with Title IX: (1) whether intercollegiate levels of 
participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in 
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments;76 or (2) 
where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and 
continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to 
the developing interests and abilities of the members of that sex;77 or (3) where 
the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, 
and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion 
such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and 
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program.78 
It is important to note that compliance under this section is not based on an 
overall evaluation of each part.79 Instead, compliance is based on whether a 
program meets any one of the particular tests.80 In effect, the “substantial 
proportionality” test provides a safe harbor for recipients under Title IX.81 
However, if an institution lacks such proportionality and fails to show that it is 
 
 70. Erin E. Buzuvis & Kristine E. Newhall, Equality Beyond the Three-Part Test: Exploring 
and Explaining the Invisibility of Title IX’s Equal Treatment Requirement, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 427, 435 (2012). See also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 50. 
 71. Buzuvis & Newhall, supra note 70, at 435. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 443; see also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 50. 
 74. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 50. 
 75. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 76. Id. (citing to the 1979 Policy Interpretation). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Anderson, supra note 35, at 340. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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“continuing to expand opportunities for athletic participation by the 
underrepresented gender,” then it must “fully and effectively accommodate” 
the interests and abilities among members of the underrepresented gender.82 
Although the standard of full and effective accommodation is high, the fact 
that there is mere interest in a sport does not require an institution to provide a 
varsity team in order to meet compliance.83 Rather, “institutions can satisfy the 
third benchmark by ensuring participatory opportunities at the intercollegiate 
level when, and to the extent that, there is ‘sufficient interest and ability among 
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a reasonably 
expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team.’”84 
Courts, generally, categorize the regulations into two broadly defined 
areas: effective accommodation, which concerns the availability of 
participation opportunities,85 and equal treatment, which includes athletic 
scholarships as well as other athletic benefits or opportunities.86 
Of particular importance is the court’s prohibition against allowing 
universities to replace public funding with private funding to support a 
particular athletic program. Support of an athletic program with private funds 
instead of public funding does not remove the program from the Title IX 
substantial proportionality calculus.87 In Chalenor v. The University of North 
Dakota, the Eight Circuit held “a school may not skirt the requirement of 
providing both sexes equal opportunity in athletic programs by providing one 
sex more than substantially proportionate opportunity through the guise of 
outside funding.”88 After the men’s wrestling program was cut in response to 
budgetary constraints, members of the program subsequently filed suit against 
the university.89 In contesting the dismissal of their team, members of the 
program alleged the university’s budgetary considerations were an illusory 
justification for dropping the team since a “private donor had offered to fund 
the wrestling program.”90 Thus “the program would not have used resources 
that otherwise would have been available to female athletes.”91 Since the 
program had guaranteed itself funding, members of the team alleged the 
university’s true purpose in cutting the program fulfilled the “University’s 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Pieronek, supra note 62, at 78; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 92 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 86. Pieronek, supra note 62, at 78; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 92. 
 87. Andrew J. Weissler, Unasked Questions: Applying Title IX’s Effective Accommodation 
Mandate to Interscholastic Athletics, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 87 (2012). 
 88. Id. at 87–88; see Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 89. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043. 
 90. Id. at 1048. 
 91. Id. at 1043. 
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desire to equalize rates of participation and resource allocation in sports by 
sex.”92 They argued allowing the university to take such action represented the 
implementation of a quota system which would run contrary to the purpose of 
Title IX.93 
In finding for the university, the Eighth Circuit made several key 
determinations regarding the use of private funds in support of intercollegiate 
athletic programs.94 The court reasoned that “once a university receives a 
monetary donation, the funds become public money, subject to Title IX’s legal 
obligations in disbursement.”95 Thus, the use of private funds to support an 
athletic program cannot be used as a shield for a “university which provides 
more than substantially proportionate athletic opportunities to one gender in 
violation of Title IX.”96 The court noted “the University had no obligation to 
accept the donation, and, even if it had, disbursement of the funds still would 
have been subject to the strictures of Title IX.”97 Even though the team may 
have acquired the requisite funding, its participation violated Title IX’s equal 
participation requirements.98 Therefore, any use of private funds “in support” 
of an athletic program is effectively barred if the use of those funds provides 
greater opportunities of participation for one sex over the other at the 
intercollegiate level.99 
Additionally, Daniels v. School Board of Brevard County, Florida 
illustrates how the principle announced in the effective-accommodation 
context of Chalenor applies with regard to equal treatment.100 Here, members 
of a girls’ varsity softball team at Merritt Island High School (MIHS) asserted 
Title IX violations and sought a preliminary injunction to remedy inequalities 
between the MIHS girls’ softball and boys’ baseball facilities.101 The alleged 
inequitable treatment included the presence of an electronic scoreboard, batting 
cages, bleachers, signs, bathroom facilities, concession stands, a press box, an 
announcer’s booth, field maintenance, and lighting at the boys’ field, all of 
which the girls’ softball field lacked.102 The board, in an attempt to justify the 
discrepancies, contested it could not be found in violation of Title IX’s 
requirements since it provided equivalent funding to both programs.103 Any 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1048. 
 95. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1048. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pieronek, supra note 62, at 115. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id; Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., Fla., 985 F. Supp. 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1997). 
 101. Daniels, 985 F. Supp. at 1460–61. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1462. 
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improvements in the boys’ facilities resulted from private funds raised through 
the work of an active booster organization.104 It argued that “it cannot be held 
responsible if the fundraising activities of one booster club are more successful 
than those of another.”105 
In rejecting the school board’s argument, the court stated “it is the 
Defendant’s responsibility to ensure equal athletic opportunities, in accordance 
with Title IX.”106 Furthermore, it concluded that “[t]his funding system is one 
to which the Defendant has acquiesced.”107 Thus, the district court held the 
school board, as a result of its acceptance of such a funding structure, was 
“responsible for the consequences of that approach.”108 The district court 
concluded the inequalities indicated the school board “ha[d] chosen to favor 
the boys’ baseball team . . . but ha[d] not seen fit to provide the girls’ softball 
team with any of these things.”109 Furthermore, the court stated “[e]ach day 
these inequalities go unredressed, the members of the girls’ softball team, 
prospective members, students, faculty and the community, are sent a clear 
message that girls’ high school varsity softball is not worth as much as boys’ 
high school varsity baseball, i.e., that girls are not as important as boys.”110 
Thus, any financial disparities, whether resulting from internal or external 
mechanisms, may result in noncompliance with the equal treatment provisions 
of Title IX.111 Acceptance of such a system, pursuant to Daniels, which results 
in unequal opportunities presented to one sex does not excuse  a university’s 
obligations to seek and maintain equal opportunity for both sexes. Ultimately, 
Daniels could potentially limit any argument universities may have with 
regards to providing a sex-neutral system which creates substantial disparities 
between male and female student-athletes. 
Title IX’s applicability to the NCAA also warrants consideration. In NCAA 
v. Smith, the Supreme Court held the NCAA’s receipt of dues payments from 
recipients of federal funding did not sufficiently subject the organization to 
Title IX’s requirements.112 Renee Smith filed suit against the NCAA alleging 
the NCAA’s refusal to grant her a waiver under its postbaccalaureate bylaw 
violated Title IX by excluding her from participation in intercollegiate athletics 
on the basis of her sex.113 While the complaint did not attack the bylaw on its 
face, it alleged that the NCAA discriminated on the basis of sex through 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Daniels, 985 F. Supp. at 1462. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1461. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Pieronek, supra note 62, at 115. 
 112. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 462 (1999). 
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granting more waivers from eligibility restrictions to male than female 
postgraduate student-athletes.114 The NCAA moved to dismiss the claim on the 
grounds that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that the NCAA was a 
recipient of federal financial assistance.115 Countering this claim, Smith argued 
that the NCAA, through its receipt of dues from intercollegiate athletic 
programs, benefited economically from its members’ receipt of federal funds, 
and, therefore, Title IX applied.116 
The Supreme Court, interpreting Section 106.2(h)’s definition of 
“recipient,”117 determined the definition “makes clear that Title IX coverage is 
not triggered when an entity merely benefits from federal funding.”118 The 
Court stated “[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or 
through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX. . . . 
Entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not.”119 
Thus, while the complaint established the NCAA indirectly received benefits 
from federal assistance afforded to its members, such a “showing, without 
more, is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage.”120 Thus, while the NCAA 
currently controls the regulations of student-athletes regarding compensation 
and impermissible benefits, if it were to allow compensation of student-athletes 
beyond the cost of attendance, any subsequent violations of Title IX would fall 
upon the individual university providing or permitting such compensation. 
II.  HOW SHOULD STUDENT-ATHLETES BE COMPENSATED? PROMINENT 
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE PAYMENT OF STUDENT-ATHLETES 
Legal scholars, members of the media, and members of the athletic 
community alike have suggested new systems through which the NCAA or its 
member institutions might compensate student-athletes for their performance. 
Suggestions range from permitting student-athletes to enter into endorsement 
deals to having the NCAA’s member institutions send paychecks directly to its 
players. 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. “Section 106.2(h) defines ‘recipient’ to include any entity ‘to whom Federal financial 
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education 
program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance.’” Id. at 468; see also 34 
C.F.R. § 106.41(h) (2012). 
 118. Smith, 525 U.S. at 468. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 469. 
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A. Pay-for-Play (Stipend Programs) 
Garnering the greatest support amongst the various proposals, the basic 
pay-for-play model asserts that universities should compensate student-athletes 
for their participation in various athletic programs through the provision of a 
monthly stipend.121 
Evidence of the proposal’s legitimacy came in 2011 when the NCAA’s 
board approved a plan to funnel a $2,000 stipend to scholarship athletes 
regardless of their need.122 While the plan was ultimately overridden by 160 of 
the 350 Division I member schools, NCAA leaders are likely to reconsider the 
stipend program again in 2014.123 The original proposal would have allowed 
Division I universities to increase grants to student-athletes by $2,000, “to 
more closely approach” the full cost of attending college.124 Mark Emmert, 
current president of the NCAA, described the plan as a means to “close the gap 
between a scholarship—which only covers tuition, room and board, and 
books—and the ‘full cost of attendance,’ which includes other miscellaneous 
expenses incurred by athletes who travel during their seasons.”125 While the 
proposal has not yet been finalized, Emmert hopes to unveil a retooled stipend 
plan likely to include a “need-based” component.126 The plan’s options would 
include (1) athletes applying for money through the Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid,127 (2) giving universities or conferences discretion as to 
how the funds would be allocated,128 and (3) calculating the stipend payments 
based on family contributions.129 
While the NCAA continues consideration of its own form of a stipend, 
legal scholars have also proposed various programs. These include a proposal 
advocating, generally, for the payment of stipends to specific athletic 
 
 121. Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A 
Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and 
the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 405 (2012). 
 122. Jeremy Fowler, NCAA President Mark Emmert Hopes to Unveil New Stipend Plan in 
April, CBS SPORTS, Jan. 1, 2013, http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jeremy-fowler 
/21483211/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-hopes-to-unveil-new-stipend-plan-in-april. 
 123. Rich Kirchen, Emmert: NCAA Will Reconsider Athlete ‘Stipends’ in 2014, MILWAUKEE 
BUS. J., Sept. 16, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/blog/2013/09/emmert-ncaa-will-
reconsider-athlete.html?page=all. 
 124. NCAA Pushes for $2K Increase for Athletes, ESPN, Oct. 25, 2011, http://espn.go.com/ 
college-sports/story/_/id/7143961/ncaa-weighing-2000-payments-student-athletes. 
 125. NCAA Prez: Stipend not ‘pay for play’, ESPN, Nov. 3, 2011, http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/7187028/ncaa-stipend-not-lean-pay-play-president-mark-emmert-says. 
 126. Fowler, supra note 122. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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programs,130 and another which promotes a smaller-sized “laundry money” 
payment made to all student-athletes.131 Within the structure of the first 
proposal, stipends would be available to student-athletes participating in the 
men’s football and basketball programs, as well as student-athletes 
participating in the women’s basketball and volleyball programs.132 
Additionally, the proposal provides each university with discretion in initially 
implementing the program and discretion regarding the dollar amount 
ultimately paid to the student-athletes.133 Finally, the proposal lifts NCAA 
monetary cap restrictions with regards to employment for scholarship student-
athletes participating in nonrevenue sports.134 The second proposal, the 
“laundry money” model, offers Division I universities the opportunity to pay 
“all student-athletes a small amount of spending money, perhaps $30–$50 per 
month, as part of their athletic scholarship.”135 Similar to the first proposal, all 
universities would be provided discretion as to whether or not they implement 
the system as well as discretion regarding the final amount provided.136 Unlike 
the first proposal, the second offers an additional form of monetary 
compensation through the incorporation of a revenue-sharing scheme.137 It 
would make “available to student-athletes a reasonable percentage of revenue 
derived each year from the football bowls, the men’s and women’s NCAA 
basketball tournaments, and shoe and apparel deals.”138 However, the plan 
would limit such payments to those student-athletes participating in programs 
producing the revenue.139 Furthermore, the proposal notes the revenue-sharing 
component would require some form of payment to members of women’s 
 
 130. See C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play For College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever, 38 
S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (1997). 
 131. See Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & 
Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 78–82 (2000). 
 132. Goplerud, supra note 130, at 1089. The proposal additionally states that other women’s 
sports may be included “in sufficient numbers to satisfy gender equity requirements.” Id. 
 133. Id. The proposal also sets forth a “salary cap” at an average of $300 per month, thus, 
capping the total amount allocated to student-athletes. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Hurst & Pressly, supra note 131, at 78–79. The proposal indicates such payments would 
cost most universities less than $100,000 per year, and, therefore, would not financially cripple 
most Division I universities. Id. 
 136. Id. at 79. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 79–80. 
 139. Id. The proposal uses the following example to illustrate this point: “[I]f the University 
of Florida football team received $3 million for its invitation to play in the 2000 Orange Bowl, 
the student-athletes on that team (and that team only) would receive a small percentage of that 
payout.” Id. 
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teams, and advocates for a blanket payment to “each female student-athlete in 
all sports.”140 
B. Revenue-Sharing Model 
The revenue-sharing model, a variation of the pay-for-play model,141 
argues that universities should compensate student-athletes through sharing 
with their student-athletes a percentage of the revenue generated by their 
respective teams.142 Generally, the model proposes that student-athletes receive 
a portion of the net143 profits generated by the athletic department.144 This 
would ensure that teams operating at a deficit would not suffer greater 
financial loss as a result of having to share a portion of its gross revenue.145 
The practice essentially involves pooling together revenue from agreed-upon 
sources and then distributing it among parties to the agreement.146 
In order to effect such change, some scholars propose an amendment to 
NCAA section 12.02.2.147 The section defines “pay” as the “receipt of funds, 
awards, or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association for participation in athletics.”148 The amendment would permit 
student-athletes to receive a portion of the revenues generated by their 
teams.149 Discussed below, the proposal includes four parts: (1) system based 
on seniority, (2) inclusion of postseason compensation, (3) compensation for 
election to athletic and academic All-American teams, and (4) partial revenue 
sharing of endorsement monies. 
The first section of the model proposes a division of revenues according to 
seniority, or “years of service,”150 as follows: (1) each player in his or her 
 
 140. Hurst & Pressly, supra note 131. 
 141. See Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 861, 884 (2002). 
 142. Corgan, supra note 121, at 410. 
 143. Id. at 411. The model takes into consideration the relative costs associated with each 
sport, which leads to the focus on sharing the net, rather than gross, profits generated by each 
team. Consequently, if a certain team for some reason fails to make any profit for that school 
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compensation. See Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure For the Exploitation of 
College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 336 (1998). 
 144. Corgan, supra note 121, at 411. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Acain, supra note 143, at 336. 
 147. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, § 12.02.3 (amended 2012). Additionally, the 
proposal argues NCAA Rule 15.2 would need to be amended, and NCAA Rule 12.1.1 would 
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that would be available to student-athletes under this plan. Acain, supra note 143, at 337. 
 148. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, § 12.02.3 (amended 2012). 
 149. Acain, supra note 143, at 337. 
 150. Id. at 338. 
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fourth year of participation would receive 1% of all revenues generated for that 
year, (2) each player in his or her third year would receive 0.75%, (3) each 
player in his or her second year would receive 0.50%, and (4) each player in 
his or her first year would receive 0.25% of the revenue.151 Finally, any money 
remaining after the division of revenue would go to the athletic department to 
pay for miscellaneous expenses associated with the program.152 
Next, the model proposes a division of any revenue generated from 
monetary rewards paid to teams participating in postseason games and 
tournaments.153 With regards to the distribution of such profits, the model 
proposes that “instead of dividing the revenues according to ‘years of 
service,’154 playoff money generated by each respective team should be 
divided according to the role each student-athlete plays in the post season.”155 
Similarly, the third part of the model includes additional compensation that 
would be awarded on the basis of either a student-athlete’s receipt of an 
academic or athletic award, or selection to academic or athletic All-American 
teams.156 
Finally, the model proposes that universities and colleges share with 
student-athletes a portion of the merchandising and endorsement revenues they 
generate.157 Accordingly, this could be achieved one of three ways.158 First, 
universities could divide a portion of all fees collected by the university 
through licensing agreements, and allocate a portion of the profits to the 
athletic department for distribution.159 Alternatively, universities could allow 
for individual teams to enter into sponsorship agreements with product 
manufactures.160 The model, as a third alternative, advocates for further 
amendments to NCAA rules to “allow student-athletes to endorse products 
both nationally and locally.”161 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 338–39. For example, a university could establish a 65% to 35% distribution in 
favor of the university in order to share profits made during successful postseason play. Id. 
 154. Id. at 338. The term “years of service” refers to Part I of the plan basing payments to 
students on seniority. 
 155. Acain, supra note 143, at 339. For example, of the 35% shared with student-athletes, 
50% should go to the starters on the team, 35% should go to the “key reserves,” and 15% should 
go to the remaining players. Id. 
 156. Id. at 339–40. The model declares “because the NCAA purports to draw a connection 
between athletics and education, lucrative awards should be given to all student-athletes who 
succeed both athletically and academically.” Id. 
 157. Id. at 341. 
 158. Id. at 341–42. 
 159. Id. at 342. 
 160. Acain, supra note 143, at 342. 
 161. Id. 
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As a result, it is argued that such a model equalizes profit in collegiate 
athletics without a need for destruction of the current system and balances the 
interests of the student-athletes and the universities they represent.162 
C. NCAA Deregulation of Indirect Financial Endeavors: The “Free Market” 
System 
Under the deregulation model, star student-athletes would earn “close to 
fair-market values” as “free agents.”163 They would do so through competing 
in seasonal professional leagues, signing endorsement deals, and engaging in 
paid promotional appearances.164 The model would permit individual student-
athletes to enter into financial agreements for their participation in the 
aforementioned areas.165 In effect, the model provides student-athletes the 
opportunity to “work” within their preferred fields during the offseason.166 It is 
argued that an offseason spent within a professional league provides the 
opportunity “for these student-athletes to assess a sports career while earning 
some money, much as other student do.”167 Additionally, advocates of the plan 
claim many star collegiate athletes have similar national recognition, and as a 
result, similar levels of marketability as those athletes competing at the 
professional level.168 The student-athletes would benefit from their own market 
ventures, while not detracting from university funds.169 Thus, allowing student-
athletes to benefit from endorsement opportunities and promotional 
appearances provides an effective means of compensating those student-
athletes.170 Argued as a “middle ground solution between traditional revenue 
sharing and stipends,”171 the plan preserves the NCAA’s notion of amateurism, 
encourages student-athletes to earn monies close to what they would earn in 
the fair market, and does not promote the shifting of more university funds into 
athletic programs.172 
 
 162. Id. at 346. Additional benefits of the proposed plan include NCAA avoidance of possible 
antitrust violations, allowance of student-athletes to profit off of their own athletic success, and a 
solution to “fixing” the current imbalance between the levels of profit enjoyed by the NCAA and 
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 163. Edelman, supra note 141, at 886. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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 168. Id. at 887. 
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Under a free market system, student-athletes would be treated similarly to 
“any other employee in the United States.”173 Under such a system, a high 
school athlete would be able to market his services to the highest bidder.174 In 
essence, “schools that value winning and its economic benefits would pay 
college athletes in addition to offering them education and training.”175 Thus, 
the market would set the appropriate compensation for each athlete,176 and the 
athlete will be “encouraged to attend a college where his talents are most 
useful and productive.”177 Additionally, the system, coupled with the one-year 
scholarship system employed by the NCAA,178 would permit universities to 
terminate the services of nonproductive athletes if they failed to perform up to 
expectations.179 Finally, the system would require supplemental education 
regulations in order to ensure the system’s effectiveness.180 It is argued that “in 
a free market, [student]-athletes would get the wonderful benefits colleges now 
offer: access to world-class education, quality coaching and facilities, and 
exposure to professional leagues.”181 Furthermore, as a result of providing 
student-athletes the ability to negotiate “longer scholarships and ensure 
adequate finances to make it through college when their playing days are 
over,” the model would most likely increase graduation rates.182 Finally, it is 
proposed that the market would ultimately ensure competitive balance, while 
allowing the NCAA to focus on improving the academic standing of the 
student-athletes.183 
D. Alternative IOC/Trust Fund Models 
Advocates suggest the NCAA could also adopt a proposal similar to the 
model currently employed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).184 
Under IOC regulations, an athlete may receive compensation for athletic 
competitions as well as outside incidental activities without losing his or her 
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status as an amateur.185 The revenue is then entered into a trust fund186 from 
which athletes are permitted to withdraw funds for living and training 
expenses, but prohibited from withdrawing the full amount of the trust fund 
until they retire.187 For example, The Athletics Congress (TAC) regulates 
American track and field athletics in such a way.188 Appearance fees to the 
athletes, living and training grants, and endorsement revenues are funneled to 
trust funds established by TAC, and athletes may only withdraw from the fund 
pursuant to specific TAC guidelines.189 
The National College Players Association (NCPA) advocates for NCAA 
adoption of the IOC’s system.190 According to the NCPA, the “Olympics 
international definition of amateurism permits amateur athletes access to the 
commercial free market.191 They are free to secure endorsement deals, get paid 
for signing autographs, etc.”192 As a result of such a model, the student-athlete 
would have the ability to contract with businesses, advertisers, apparel 
companies, and others to profit from his or her success.193 The NCPA argues 
that the “NCAA’s version of amateurism is impractical and is an unjust 
financial arraignment imposed upon college athletes.”194 If adopted, the 
Olympic model would still regard student-athletes as “amateurs,” thus 
fulfilling the spirit of intercollegiate sports, while also allowing student-
athletes to benefit from individual commercial endeavors.195 Moreover, legal 
scholars in favor of adopting the model argue it does not compromise the 
NCAA’s stated goal of amateurism.196 The Olympics, “the most sacred of 
‘amateur institutions,’”197 recognizes compensation to athletes without 
significantly altering or detracting from its goal of amateurism, and, therefore, 
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the NCAA can follow suit.198 The proposed plan would allow both the NCAA 
and its member institutions to refrain from offering any money to individual 
athletes, while acknowledging “the commercial nature of intercollegiate 
athletics”199 and recognizing “that student-athletes are valuable contributors to 
its success.”200 Furthermore, the funds for the accounts could be drawn from 
preexisting sources,201 thus eliminating the potential for bankrupting 
universities unable to support the stipend program. 
Within the context of intercollegiate athletics, several variations of the 
Olympic model set forth further guidelines regarding what compensation might 
enter the trust and further limitations on the withdrawal from the trusts. For 
example, compensation could be limited to those funds associated with 
merchandise sales.202 Regarding limitations, the NCAA and its member 
institutions would be responsible for delineating permissible circumstances 
where student-athletes could draw from the funds.203 In order to ensure 
student-athletes do not abuse such a system, “each student’s trust account 
[could] be supervised by an NCAA-appointed (and student-athlete approved) 
trustee.”204 The trustee would be responsible for withdrawing funds from the 
account for activities deemed “appropriate.”205 The standards for withdrawal 
could be made as a result of negotiation, at the outset of negotiations, and 
made on a case-by-case determination accounting for the specific 
circumstances of each individual student-athlete.206 Alternatively, the 
withdrawal could be further limited to allow withdrawals for “money needed to 
supplement the direct costs of education.”207 Furthermore, the NCAA could 
implement restrictions requiring satisfactory academic benchmarks and 
continued participation in athletics for receipt of any funds.208 Finally, others 
propose that receipt of the funds be conditioned upon the student-athlete’s 
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graduation with a bachelor’s degree.209 Simply put, “[i]f you go pro early or 
drop out, you never get the income. You only get paid when you earn your 
diploma.”210 While “there will always be those one-and-done bonanzas,” fewer 
than 2% of college football and basketball players make it onto a professional 
team roster.211 Therefore, “if a player leaves college without a degree but 
returns later—for instance, after that pro career has ended or never started—to 
finish the necessary coursework for it, the escrow account would be waiting 
with accumulated interest.”212 
III.  WILL ANY OF THEM WORK? EXAMINING TITLE IX’S EFFECT ON THE 
PROPOSED PAYMENT PLANS 
A. Stipend Programs 
With Title IX’s equal opportunity requirement and the overwhelming costs 
currently incurred by each individual university, the stipend program falls short 
of justly compensating student-athletes while maintaining the current 
intercollegiate athletic system. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) noted in a 
1998 policy interpretation that a “disparity” in the awarding of athletic 
scholarships “refers to the difference between the aggregate amount of money 
athletes of one sex received in one year, and the amount they would have 
received if their share of the entire annual budget for athletic scholarships had 
been awarded in proportion to their participation rates.”213 The OCR further 
stated that if there is an “unexplained disparity of more than [1%]” then “there 
will be a strong presumption that the school is in violation of the substantially 
proportionate requirement.”214 As the NCAA model currently stands, its 
stipend program would fall under financial aid.215 Accordingly, the OCR 
would view any disparity in stipend payments between men’s and women’s 
programs greater than 1% as “clear evidence of a conscious decision by the 
school to provide an inequitable amount of scholarships to male and female 
student-athletes.”216 If universities chose to compensate male student-athletes 
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they would undoubtedly be required to provide the same or substantially the 
same amount of compensation to their female student-athletes.217 This alone 
would not violate Title IX on its face. As long as the compensation provided to 
student-athletes is awarded in proportion to their participation rates, the pay-
for-play model may succeed. 
However, accounting for the current financial status218 of most Division I 
athletic programs, Title IX’s requirement of proportional awards to both sexes 
would most likely significantly limit any implementation of the program. 
While a small portion of universities could potentially sustain these types of 
payments to both the men’s and women’s programs, the majority could not. It 
is estimated that for the 2011–2012 year, only twenty-two Division I athletic 
programs generated enough funds to cover athletics’ expenses.219 For example, 
the Rutgers University Athletics’ Department “ran a $28 million deficit in 
2012 and used university and student-fee money to balance its budget.”220 
Rutgers projects that the implementation of a stipend system would add 
another half-million dollars to the deficit.221 For an overwhelming majority of 
Division I athletic programs, providing a stipend to all student-athletes is 
simply unfeasible. 
Moreover, any non-NCAA proposals which advocate limiting 
compensation to those student-athletes in revenue-producing sports would 
most likely run afoul of Title IX’s mandate.222 While a limit would clearly 
make the programs more economically viable, pursuant to Title IX and the 
OCR’s policy interpretation, identical benefits would be mandatory.223 
According to NCAA rule 15.5.5.1, “there shall be a limit of 13 on the total 
number of [scholarships] in men’s basketball at each institution.”224 Pursuant 
to rule 15.5.6.1, there “shall be an annual limit of 85 on the total number of 
[scholarships]” in men’s football.225 Thus, under a system in which only men’s 
basketball and football received a stipend, the maximum number of male 
student-athletes eligible for a stipend is ninety-eight student-athletes. With that 
said, NCAA regulations allow for a maximum number of fifteen scholarships 
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for women’s basketball and a maximum of twenty scholarships for women’s 
volleyball.226 Thus, under the proposal, there would be a shortfall of sixty-
three, or about 47%, of female student-athletes entitled to a stipend not 
receiving one. As previously noted, according to the OCR anything above 1% 
is “clear evidence of a conscious decision by the school to provide an 
inequitable amount of scholarships to male and female student-athletes.” If a 
university sought to remain compliant with Title IX, it would be required to 
provide an additional sixty-three stipends to female student-athletes 
participating in programs outside of women’s basketball and volleyball. 
Financially, if a $2,000 stipend is provided to all 196 student-athletes, the total 
cost of the program balloons to $392,000 in additional costs. For most 
universities, bearing close to $400,000 in additional costs is simply not feasible 
from an economic viewpoint. 
B. Revenue Sharing 
Unlike the stipend programs, the revenue-sharing models proposed would 
most likely fail to comport with two requirements set forth by Title IX. Under 
Chalenor, once a university accepts “private [funds]”227 those funds “become 
public money, subject to Title IX’s legal obligations in disbursement.”228 Thus, 
a university’s acceptance of funds generated as a result of “contributions,”229 
“rights/licensing,”230 and all other sources of revenue, including “game 
guarantees, . . . support from third-parties guaranteed to the school such as TV 
income, . . . and tournament/bowl game revenues from conferences,”231 would 
most likely be subject to the requirements established in Chalenor. Once a 
university accepts private funds, the institution is legally obligated to disperse 
those funds pursuant to Title IX’s requirements. Similar to the Eighth Circuit’s 
finding in Chalenor, the Office of Civil Rights has expressed concern in the 
past that “private funds, . . . although neutral in principle, are likely subject to 
the same historical patterns that Title IX was enacted to address.”232 Legal 
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scholars point to the OCR’s recognition that boys’ sports generally occupy a 
favored position in society that results in stronger public support.233 Thus, “if a 
school could simply channel support for boys' programs through private funds, 
Title IX’s equal treatment mandate ‘could routinely be undermined.’”234 The 
OCR has made clear that the use of private funds, such as “booster club 
fundraising,” to support an athletic program does not itself violate Title IX,235 
but schools that choose to accept such funds maintain their obligation to 
provide equal treatment in the aggregate.236 It is clear, pursuant to Chalenor 
and the OCR’s interpretations, that once a university makes the decision to 
accept private funding, they must still hold true to their obligations under Title 
IX. 
Considering the four-part proposal, the first, third, and fourth sections of 
the model would most likely comply with Title IX since the model advocates 
for sex-neutral disbursement of funds.237 The revenue-sharing program’s 
second section, the division of revenue generated as a result of successful 
postseason play, would ultimately fail to satisfy Title IX under Chalenor and 
ultimately provide unequal treatment to student-athletes based on sex. While 
the section is facially sex-neutral, universities that experience success in 
Division I football bowl games and the Division I men’s NCAA basketball 
tournament receive increasingly high levels of profit.238 For example, the 
University of Louisville, “unquestionably the nation’s wealthiest men’s 
basketball program,” generated an estimated $27 million in 2012,239 while the 
University of Connecticut women’s basketball team generated about $4.9 
million the previous year.240 The system effectively funnels substantially 
higher monetary compensation to a small percentage of male student-
athletes—those who experience success in a bowl game or throughout the 
NCAA Division I basketball tournament—for their postseason success. Funds 
provided directly to a small portion of male-student athletes would run afoul of 
disbursing all private funds equally, pursuant to Title IX’s requirements. As a 
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result, a university would, in effect, skirt its requirement of providing both 
sexes equal opportunity in athletic programs by providing one sex more than 
substantially proportionate opportunity for economic gain through the guise of 
outside funding. Under the guidance of the OCR letter and the Eighth Circuit’s 
holding in Chalenor, the proposal’s distribution plan premised on successful 
postseason play to only those athletes competing on teams which experience 
postseason success would most likely violate Title IX’s equal treatment 
provisions and equal opportunity provisions. 
Similarly, the “laundry money” proposal, a hybrid stipend-revenue sharing 
program, fails due to its limit on providing additional compensation derived 
from revenue brought in by the individual athletic programs. While the 
program advocates for a blanket payment to each female student-athlete, such 
funds would not excuse a university’s obligation to disburse the private funds 
received equally. As stated above, if any portion of revenue generated went 
directly to the members of the program, the university would again fail to 
satisfy its requirement to provide both sexes equal treatment under Title IX. 
C. NCAA Deregulation of Indirect Financial Endeavors: The “Free Market” 
System 
Although both the deregulation and free-market models may appear 
facially sex-neutral, both models most likely violate Title IX’s equal treatment 
provisions. With regards to deregulation, if the model is assessed through 
“comparing the availability, quality and kinds of benefits, opportunity, and 
treatment to members of both sexes,”241 the model ultimately fails. As it is 
recognized, “boys’ sports generally occupy a favored position in society that 
results in stronger public support.”242 This trend extends into the context of 
professional sports.243 While monetary “benefits” within the model are not 
necessarily included within the current structure of Title IX,244 the OCR has 
explicitly stated the list of categories included is not exhaustive.245 Thus, 
monetary benefits, if the OCR made such a determination, could be included. 
Male student-athletes who participate in offseason professional leagues, sign 
endorsements, and collect fees for paid promotional activities, would most 
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likely receive substantially higher monetary benefits when compared to their 
female counterparts. 
Similar to the school board in Daniels, a university would most likely 
justify any financial discrepancies as a result of the “popularity” and “public 
support” of particular teams.246 Thus, the universities could not be in violation 
of Title IX since they permitted all student-athletes the opportunity to 
participate in the system. However, the external factors present, similar to the 
“active booster organization” in Daniels, would not excuse a university from 
complying with Title IX’s requirements. If a university is responsible for 
implementing, monitoring, or allowing such a model, the university has 
effectively acquiesced to such a system. As a result, it would therefore be 
responsible for the consequences. External factors do not excuse a university’s 
“responsibility to ensure equal athletic opportunities in accordance with Title 
IX.”247 Furthermore, as long as the model is in place and accepted by a 
university, the university sends a clear message that women’s intercollegiate 
athletic programs are not worth as much as men’s intercollegiate athletic 
programs. 
The free-market model only exacerbates the issues found within the 
deregulation model. Schools that “value winning and its economic benefits” 
would undoubtedly invest in those student-athletes they determine will 
generate the highest economic benefit. The current system implicates two 
sports: men’s football and men’s basketball.248 Assuming the benefits of the 
free-market model come to fruition,249 universities would still look to 
providing the highest monetary compensation to those potential student-
athletes they view as the most profitable. The model would value student-
athletes in two programs and essentially ignore the rest. A model that promotes 
creating potentially high monetary benefits in two exclusive sports would in 
effect create a “policy” that is “discriminatory in effect,” create a disparity of a 
“substantial and unjustified nature,” and create a disparity “substantial enough 
in and of [itself] to deny equality.”250 
D. Alternative IOC/Trust Fund Models 
The viability of the alternative IOC/trust fund model ultimately depends on 
the level of involvement regarding the NCAA. Under the current proposals, the 
NCAA, not its member institutions, would ultimately be responsible for the 
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implementation and operation of the student-athlete’s accounts.251 If the 
individual universities themselves were responsible for the funds, the model 
would most likely violate Title IX’s regulations regarding the use of private 
funds to support athletics programs.252 However, if the NCAA took 
accountability for the model, the accounts and use of such accounts might not 
necessarily violate Title IX. 
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title IX in Smith, “coverage 
is not triggered when an entity merely benefits from federal funding.”253 The 
establishment of such trust fund accounts would most likely not alter the 
applicability of Title IX to the NCAA. Under the model, the NCAA would 
regulate the private funds entering each student-athlete’s account while also 
regulating the private funds withdrawn from the account. The NCAA would 
continue to “only benefit economically from federal assistance” through its 
receipt of dues payments, while also monitoring and exercising oversight of 
private funds flowing to its student-athletes. The sole entity receiving and 
distributing funds is an entity, under Smith, currently not covered by Title IX. 
However, it must be noted that in its decision, the Supreme Court noted that 
such a “showing, without more, is insufficient to trigger Title IX’s 
coverage.”254 Therefore, it is feasible the NCAA’s implementation of such a 
system satisfies the “without more” qualification promulgated by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Amid the continuous flow of controversies involving alleged improper 
benefits flowing to student-athletes, improper contact with sports agents, and 
debate over whether student-athletes should justifiably be compensated for 
their athletic performance, Title IX’s obligations remain a constant. Although 
proposals for payments to student-athletes continue to evolve, none have 
effectively resolved the conflict between the plan itself and Title IX’s 
obligations. Title IX, as it currently stands, directly or indirectly limits what the 
NCAA permits and what universities and colleges may ultimately implement. 
As the profits and revenue created through astronomically high agreements 
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between the NCAA continue to grow, student-athletes deserve some form of 
compensation. How it is achieved has still yet to be determined. 
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